Abstract: When tag privacy is required in radio frequency identification (ID) system, a reader needs to identify, and optionally authenticate, a multitude of tags without revealing their IDs. One approach for identification with lightweight tags is that each tag performs pseudo-random function with his unique embedded key. In this case, a reader (or a back-end server) needs to perform a brute-force search for each tag-reader interaction, whose cost gets larger when the number of tags increases. In this paper, we suggest a simple and efficient identification technique that reduces readers computation to 0 (m log N) without increasing communication cost. Our technique is based on the well-known "meet-in-themiddle" strategy used in the past to attack symmetric ciphers.
I. INTRODUCTION
A general radio frequency identification (RFID) system consists of a back-end database (or simply database), multiple readers, and a multitude of tags. The database maintains all system data. A reader relays data between the database and tags by wireless communication with multiple tags in the same period. A tag is typically attached to an object or a set of objects. A tag usually contains a unique identification number and some object-related data. We skip the technical details of a general RFID architecture and refer to [1] for a good introduction to RFID technology.
In a typical RFID system, the reader and the tags communicate wirelessly. Wireless communication prompts the same set of security threats encountered in a general wireless system. Eavesdropping on tag-reader communication might allow the adversary to track tags. A malicious reader can likewise track tags. A fraudulent (e.g., cloned) tag can convince a reader that it is genuine by supplying fake information. Last but not least, compromised tags and readers need to be promptly revoked. Various solutions to some these threats have been proposed, e.g., in [2] and [3] .
In this paper, we focus on tag identification using keyed pseudo-random functions (PRFs) (see [4] for definitions and a Manuscript received January 12, 2011; approved for publication by Chae Hoon Lim, Division I Editor, September 29,2011.
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G. Tsudik is with the Department of computer sciences, University of California, Irvine, USA, email: gts@ics.uci.edu. theoretical background on PRFs). Usage of PRFs for identification prompts a key management problem. If a single secret key is used for all tags, compromise of a single tag breaks the entire system. If a unique per-tag secret key is used, privacy concerns preclude the tag from identifying itself explicitly during reader-tag interaction; therefore, the reader has to "guess" the tag's identity and determine it via brute force. Since modern RFID systems can involve upwards of a billion tags and require readers to scan as many tags as possible as fast as possible, a brute force search for each tag-reader interaction is very inefficient. This triggers our motivation for reducing tag identification complexity on the reader side.
A. Contribution Summary
We propose a secure and efficient RFID tag identification technique using PRFs. The distinctive feature of our technique is that the reader identifies the tag with only 2m PRFs, where N is the number of tags in the entire RFID system. It is obtained by exploiting the meet-in-the-middle attack in a constructive way to identify the tag. This strategy has been proposed originally to attack the double data encryption standard (DES) encryption [5] in which the equation C == E K 1 (E K 2 (P)) is converted into EK~(C) == E K 2 (P) for the DES encryption E K (.) with key K. Whereas, an adversary, who does not know the keys, needs to exhaustively search the entire 0(2£+1) keyspace, even if it uses the meet-in-the-middle attack strategy [5] , where 2£ is the key bit-size. We also propose some extensions to the basic technique.
B. Related Work
There are several RFID tag identification protocols providing varying degrees of tag privacy. Public key cryptography gives a clear solution, but is too expensive for most types of tags. Identification protocols using only private key cryptography require O(N) reader computation to identify one among N tags. It can be reduced to 0(N 2 / 3 ) using time-memory tradeoff techniques [6] . In 2004, Molnar and Wagner [7] used a b-ary key-tree for reducing reader computation to O(b 10gb N) with the increased communication cost from 0(1) to o(logb N). As b gets smaller, the Molnar/Wagner technique increasingly suffers from the gradual exposure problem, whereby, compromise of a one tag allows the adversary to track groups of tags [8] . Our technique does not have this problem, and can be combined with tree-based approach to reduce reader computation further to O( J[jlogb N) with the same communication cost. In 2007, Avoine et al. suggested a group-based approach [9] to reduce reader computation to O(m) by doubling communication cost. Our method has similar reader computation, but does not increase communication cost.
II. EFFICIENT KEY SEARCHING PROTOCOL
We now describe our technique for efficient tag identification. We assume the following system participants.
• Server (SRV): Trusted entity that sets up the system.
• Reader (RDR): Trusted device that interacts with tags.
• Tags (T 1 , · · ·, T N ): Set of RFID tags.
• Adversary (ADV): Malicious entity that aims to subvert the system.
A. System Setup
We assume that each tag is equipped with a PRF and has enough memory for a unique secret key shared with the reader. In the setup phase, SRV selects two global parameters: (1) Security parameter (e.g., = 80 for 2 80 security) and (2) sufficiently large integer N which represents the maximum number of tags in the system (e.g., N = 1, 000, 000). For notational convenience and without loss of generality, we assume that integer N is a square. 1 Next, SRV chooses two distinct subsets K1 and K2 of size √ N in {0, 1} as keysets. Then, for each tag
where ∈ R means "randomly chosen from". Furthermore, the selection is done without replacement, i.e., for
represents a tag's identity and its unique identifier. The two key-sets K1, K2 are distributed to each reader.
In the end, each tag only stores a 2 bit key
Although all tag keys are distinct, RDR only needs to store set K1 and K2, which together amount to 2 √ N bits.
B. Private Identification Protocol
We follow the protocol defined in the ISO/IEC 9798-2 standard [11] . First, RDR sends a random challenge r ∈ R {0, 1} to a tag. The tag generates its own random number r ∈ R {0, 1} , computes
and sends C, r back to RDR.
The reader searches for the tag key in two key-sets K1 and K2 by checking
If there is a match, RDR identifies the tag.
Note that the protocol requires the tag to generate its own random number r and include it in all PRF invocations. This is necessary in order to avoid tracking by malicious readers. If the tag computed
(r), it would be trivial for a malicious reader to track the tag, since, given the same tag and the same reader challenge r, the tags replies (C-s) would be the same. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a realistic RFID usage scenario where malicious reader attacks are not applicable.
1 Otherwise, we would need to replace Fig. 1 . Key search pseudocode. 
D. Details and Measurements
Instead of a PRF, we can also use pseudo-random permutation (PRP). Every PRP has an inverse function PRP −1 K (·) which can be easily computed with the knowledge of K. In that case, the tag would compute
(r, r )). RDR would search for the tag by checking:
Any efficient and secure symmetric cipher (e.g., advanced encryption standard (AES)) can be used as a PRF. In fact, AES can be used as both PRP and PRF. For example, Feldhofer et al. [10] proposed an implementation of 128 bit AES for RFID tags which requires only 3, 600 gates. If the cipher requires a 128 bit key, we can add certain padding to bit keys. More compact hardware implementations are expected in the near future. Table 1 shows average run-time for our protocol using AES as the underlying PRF with N = 1, 000, 000. All experiments were conducted on a 1.86 GHz Intel Core-Duo processor with 2 GB memory, MS Windows Vista and VS.NET. All timings were obtained from averages over 100 runs with randomly chosen K 1 , K 2 , r, and r . The search time is comparatively high since, in the worst case, RDR invokes PRF |K2| times. Our search algorithm takes about 2.07 ms per tag, which is 200 times faster than brute force search (433.52 ms). We now construct two extensions to mitigate this problem. The first reduces ADV's probability of tracking and impersonation of indirectly-compromised tags. The second extension completely prevents impersonation (but not tracking) of indirectly-compromised tags via explicit authentication. In addition, we propose a protocol combining with tree-based protocol of Molnar and Wagner [7] .
III. EXTENSIONS

In the proposed protocol, if
ADV directly compromises c tags, it can effectively impersonate and track c 2 − c other tags. For example, consider two compromised tags T i and T j . Given their keys:K i 1 , K i 2 , K j 1 , K j 2 ,
A. Extension I: k-resilient Protocol
In the system setup phase, SRV selects a resiliency parameter k. Then, the maximum number of tags is N 0 , where
Since the probability of a key-pair being assigned to a real tag is N 0 /N ≤ 1/k 2 , the expected number of non-compromised tags whose keys are revealed is (c 
B. Extension II: Authentication Protocol
At setup time, for each tag, we introduce an additional bit key unique K i 3 ∈ r K3, i.e., each T i has a three-part key:
For each interaction with RDR, in addition to C as described above, the tag also computes C = PRF K i 3 (r, r ) and sends C, C to RDR. Next, RDR performs key search using C as before to determine
3 to identify the correct K i 3 using C . This last step represents tag authentication, as opposed to plain key-search which corresponds to (private) tag identification.
In this extension, it might seem necessary for RDR to additionally store the entire N -element set K3 as well as a way to associate each key in K3 with a tuple drawn from K1 × K2. This would represent a heavy storage burden over the plain protocol where RDR stored only 2 √ N keys. However, one simple optimization which requires no extra storage is to generate each K 
C. Combination with Tree-based Protocol
Our basic protocol can be used with Molnar and Wagner's tree-based protocol (MW protocol) [7] . The protocol considers tags as leaves in a tree, then associate each edge in the tree with a secret (level key). Each tag should store the secrets corresponding to the path from the root to the tag. RDR is required to store all secrets of which number is determined by branching factors of the tree. In a d-ary tree, for identifying a tag, RDR needs O(log d N ) rounds of interactions with the tag and d log d N PRF computations. If our protocol is used as a subprotocol for searching level keys, then the tag's computation is doubled up but the RDR's computation is reduced to 2 √ d log d N PRFs with the same communication cost.
In the example using two-level tree for N = 2 20 tags, presented in [7] , the branching factor is d = 1024. In this case, RDR needs to compute 2 10 log 2 10 2 20 = 2048 PRFs for MW protocol, but it is reduced to 2 × 2 5 log 2 10 2 20 = 128 PRFs for our protocol.
IV. ANALYSIS
We now briefly discuss efficiency and security properties of the proposed protocol.
A. Efficiency
In our (non-extended) protocol, the reader requires O(|K1| + |K2|) operations for computing PRF K1 (r, r ) and PRF K2 (r, r ) for K 1 ∈ K1 and K 2 ∈ K2 and O((|K1| + |K2|) log|K1|) for sorting ciphertexts and searching collisions. Therefore, when we take |K1| = |K2| = N 1/2 , a reader requires only O( √ N log N ) computation cost, where N is the maximum number of tag keys. For an adversary who does not have an information on the sets K1 and K2, searching the key pair requires exhaustive search over all 2 +1 keys even though "meetin-the-middle" attack strategy is used with a pair of plaintext and ciphertext. Our identification protocol requires only O( ) bits per message (random number).
In the authentication protocol, when |K1| = |K2| = N α , the verification time is about (2N α + N 1−2α ) PRF computations. We find that α = 1/3 is optimal with the time complexity O(N 1/3 log N ). Table 2 compares the security of the proposed scheme with the previous well-known schemes (whose performance is referred to [12] ). The second, third, and fourth columns indicate the bit size of each tag key, the bit size of the communication overhead, and the computation cost when using PRF with security parameter . Scheme Tag key Comm.
Rdr comp. [7] log N log N O(log N ) [6] O 
B. Security and Privacy
Besides identification and authentication, the important issues in RFID systems are privacy and security. Privacy in RFID systems indicates the tag privacy that a tag can not be tracked down by unauthorized readers. Especially, the system is called actively private if the untraceability is guaranteed even when the adversarial reader can interrogate the tag actively. Security in RFID systems implies that no impersonation is possible without the key of the tag. In this subsection, we consider only those two issues-impersonation and traceabilty. We remark that for other security issues our scheme shares the same properties with other stateless identification schemes [7] , [6] . For more information on privacy issues of RFID systems, refer to [12] .
If no tag is compromised, it is easy to see that the proposed protocols are resistant to both tracking and impersonation. The former is because ADV can not link two different tag responses, and the latter -because ADV can not impersonate a tag without knowing that tag's key.
For example, consider the situation where c tags are compromised. In our basic protocol, this translates into at most c 2 − c indirectly compromised tags, i.e., for which (K 1 , K 2 ) are revealed. Aside from these tags, ADV can not tell if a tag has K 1 or K 2 as a part of his key. Therefore, tags with partially compromised key are still secure in the sense that the exhaustive search for the other key requires 2 computations.
In our k-resilient protocol, the number of indirectlycompromised tags can be made small by increasing the computation cost. In our authentication protocol, even the indirectly compromised tags can not be impersonated since their K 3 values remain secret (since (K 1 , K 2 ) is only used to narrow down the candidates for K 3 ). However, c 2 N 1−2α indirectly compromised tags can be weakly tracked in the sense that it can be determined only whether it is one of the N 1−2α tags with the same (K 1 , K 2 ). Table 3 compares the performance of the proposed scheme with the previous well-known schemes. The second and the third columns indicate if the scheme is actively private and if it provides authentication or identification. The third and the fourth columns indicate the number of tags which can be impersonated and which can be weakly tracked when c tags are captured and their private keys are compromised.
In summary, if the number of compromised tags is very small, both basic and k-resilient protocols are appropriate; otherwise, our authentication protocol extension is preferable.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed an efficient and secure RFID tag identification and authentication technique using the well-known meet-in-themiddle strategy. In the proposed, the reader computation is reduced to O( √ N log N ) where N is the maximal number of tags. For authentication, we need to add one more message but the reader computation is reduced to O(N 1/3 log N ). 
